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Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Blackmun found fault with the
Arizona Supreme Court's narrowing construction of the aggravating
factor of "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner." Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(6) (1989). Blackmun reasoned that the Arizona
Supreme Court had identified many such factors and had "shown itself
so willing to add new factors when a perceived need arises, that the body
of its precedents places no meaningful limitations on the application of
this aggravating circumstance." Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at 3111. In other
words, Arizona's narrowing construction of the aggravating factor is not
prospective, but rather retrospective in that it expands the definition to
include whatever characterizes the case currently under review.
Blackmun also argued that a proportionality review that involves
a comparison between the case under review and prior state court
decisions applying the same aggravating factor, is necessary in capital
cases no matter what standard of review the habeas court uses. The
comparison would be a means of determining whether the state court's
application of its construction to the instant case expands the scope of the
aggravating factor in such a way as to make a previously valid limiting
construction unconstitutionally broad. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at 3113. The
comparison approach would allow a defendant on federal habeas to raise
challenges based on how the aggravating circumstance had previously
been construed by the reviewing court.
Mandating use of the "rational factfinder" standard established in
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Court also said that a state
court's finding of an aggravating circumstance is arbitrary or capricious
"if and only if no reasonable sentencer could have so concluded."
Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at 3103. Curiously, the Court also relied on a
dissenting opinion by Justice White in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980). White reasoned that when the issue on review is solely whether
a state court properly found the existence of a constitutionally narrowed
aggravating circumstance, the Court has never required federal courts
"to peermajestically overthe [state] court's shoulder so that [they] might
second-guess its interpretation of facts that quite reasonably- perhaps
even quite plainly- fit within the statutory language." Id. at 450. Thus,
the Court concluded that "respect for a state court's findings of fact and
application of its own law counsels against the sort of de novo review
undertaken by the Court of Appeals in this case." Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at
3102.
The Jeffers decision marks a significant change in habeas cases.
Lower federal courts must now apply the standard of Jackson v. Vir-
ginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), which says that when a federal habeas
claimant alleges thathis state conviction is unsupported by the evidence,
federal courts must determine only whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime or the appropriately
narrowed aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,
there will be less supervision of application of the Virginia vileness
factor in federal habeas cases.
Virginia, like Arizona, applies its vileness factor retrospectively,
expanding the definition to accommodate the case under review. (See
case summary of Mu'min v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.)
At trial, an attempt can be made to combat this unfair "moving
target" approach. Defendant should try to obtain notice and an oppor-
tunity to defend against factors upon which the Commonwealth will rely
and to limit the Commonwealth to those factors. This can be done by
filing a pretrial motion for a bill of particulars which compels the
prosecution: (a) to identify the aggravating factors upon which the
Commonwealth will rely, including how many and which of the three
vileness components will be asserted; and (b) to identify the narrowing
construction which will be used and to supply evidence supporting that
assertion.
If the response from the Commonwealth is general and simply
names everything in the statute, the defense attorney should look at the
evidence and make a motion to strike factors which are not supported by
the evidence, prohibiting the Commonwealth from relying on an aggra-
vating factor, or component thereof, which is unsupported by the
evidence.
Summary and analysis by:
Ginger M. Jonas
CLEMONS v. MISSISSIPPI
110 S. Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In need of cash, Chandler Clemons called a pizza delivery man
with the intent to rob him. After taking money and some pizza from the
delivery vehicle, Clemons shot the delivery man, Arthur Shorter, even
though Shorter begged for his life. Clemons fled the scene and the victim
died shortly thereafter. The trial court convicted Clemons of capital
murder. At the sentencing hearing, the State presented-evidence of two
aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed during the course of
a robbery for pecuniary gain, and (2) the murder was an "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" killing. Finding both aggravating factors
present and that they sufficiently outweighed any mitigating circum-
stances, the jury sentenced Clemons to death.
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Clemons'
sentence but found that the Mississippi aggravating circumstance of an
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" killing was constitutionally
invalid in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (holding the "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance invalid under eighth and
fourteenth amendments because the statutory language did not direct the
jury's discretion in deciding when the death penalty is appropriate).
However, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that "when one aggra-
vating circumstance is found to be invalid or unsupported by the
evidence, a remaining valid aggravating circumstance will nonetheless
support the death penalty verdict." Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d 1354,
1362 (Miss. 1988). Clemons petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari, and in an opinion filed by Justice White, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia, the Supreme Court vacated
Clemons' sentence and remanded the case to the Mississippi Supreme
Court.
HOLDING
The Court held that the United States Constitution does not
prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is
based in part on an invalid or improperly applied aggravating circun-
stance, as long as the appellate court either reweighs the aggravating and
mitigating evidence or conducts a harmless error review. The Court
vacated Clemons' sentence and remanded the case to the Mississippi
Supreme Court because it was unclear whether that court correctly
employed either of those methods of review.
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Citing its decisions in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)
(Holding that sentencing court's failure to consider the defendant's
turbulent family history as a mitigating factor was constitutional error),
and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (Holding that sentencer must
allow consideration of any aspect of the defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant offers as
the basis for a sentence less than death), the Court stated that the eighth
amendment requires the sentencing decision to be based on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the defendant, his background, and his
crime. Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (1990). The Court
also noted that Eddings established two objectives to be followed when
evaluating death penalty claims underthe eighth amendment: "measured
consistent application and fairness to the accused." Eddings, 455 U.S. at
110-111. The Court reasoned that careful appellate court weighing of
aggravating against mitigating circumstances wouldproduce therequired
consistent application of the death penalty. Such a weighing process
would also result in fairness to the accused, especially because state
supreme courts often review death sentences.
The Court remanded this case to the Mississippi Supreme Court
because the opinion below did not clearly state whether the court did in
fact perform a weighing function, and whether it claimed the power to
reweigh at the appellate level under state law. Under the Eddings and
Lockett decisions, an automatic rule of affirmance in a weighing state
would be invalid because itwould not give defendants the individualized
treatment that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of
mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances.
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion stating that the
majority's speculation that the Mississippi Supreme Court could reweigh
aggravating and mitigating circumstances andpossibly salvage Clemons'
death sentence amounted to an advisory opinion. Clemons, 110 S. Ct. at
1455. He further reasoned that appellate court reweighing of a death
sentence that in part rests on a constitutionally impermissible factor
allows the reviewing court to assume the role of sentencer. Blackmun
concluded that appellate sentencing is improper because appellate
courts do not hear the trial testimony or observe the accused, and
therefore, appellate courts have diminished ability to act as factfinders.
As in Mississippi, the application of Virginia's vileness factor is
often unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (Holding that the jury's
discretion to impose the death penalty is unguided unless the trial court
communicates a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the meaning
of vileness factors); and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)
(Holding that the words "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman," standing alone, fail to limit the jury's discretion).
Under Virginia Code Section 19.2-264AC an individual may
receive the death sentence if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt the
probability that: (1) the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society
(future dangerousness); or (2) that the defendant's conduct in commit-
ting the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to
the victim" (vileness). Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4C (Repl. Vol. 1990).
If both the future dangerousness and vileness factors originally are
found, and one aggravating circumstance later is found to be invalid or
unsupported by the evidence, the Virginia Supreme Court claims the
authority automatically to salvage the deathpenalty without any weighing
or harmless error analysis, and without considering mitigation evidence
at all. See case summary ofMu'min v. Commonwealth, CapitalDefense
Digest, this issue.
Virginia's capital scheme differs from that of Mississippi because
the Mississippi statutory scheme expressly calls for the weighing and
balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-19-101(3)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1989). Virginia Code Section 19.2-
264AC only requires the sentencer to consider mitigating evidence and
to find an aggravating factor to support a sentence of death. However, the
absence of a formal weighing process in the Virginia statutory scheme
is not dispositive because a Virginia jury has the option to sentence the
defendant to life even if both aggravating circumstances are present.
Thus, aweighingprocess arguably occurs becausethejury mustconsider
both aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the appropriate
sentence.
Virginia attorneys should also observe that the appellate findings
authorized in Clemons - balancing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and harmless error review - open to litigation the fact-
finding machinery of the Virginia Supreme Court when one of two
aggravating factors found at trial is invalidated. In summary, Clemons
does nothold, but strongly suggests, that Virginia's "automatic salvaging"
holdings are unconstitutional. If the Virginia Supreme Court abandons
a claim of authority to automatically salvage death sentences, the next
step for the defendant is to litigate the adequacy of the supreme court's
rules and procedure for fact finding.
Summary and analysis by:
Ginger M. Jonas
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United State Supreme Court
FACTS
During September 1983, Scott Wayne Blystone, accompanied by
his girlfriend and another couple, picked up a hitchhiker along a
Pennsylvania road. Blystone intended to rob the hitchhiker, Dayton
Charles Smithburger. Learning that Smithburger had very little money,
Blystone pulled off the road and searched him in a nearby field,
recovering only thirteen dollars. Blystone ordered Smithburger to lie
face down, and then he shot Smithburger six times in the back of the
head. During subsequent conversations, Blystone bragged in detail
about killing Smithburger.
The Court of Common Pleas convicted Blystone of first-degree
murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit homicide, and criminal
conspiracy to commit robbery. At the sentencing stage of the capital
trial, the Pennsylvania jury found that Blystone "committed a killing
while in the perpetration of a felony", one of the aggravating factors
under the Pennsylvania death penalty statute. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
9711(d)(6) (1988). The Pennsylvania death penalty statute mandates
death if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances, or if there is at least one aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstances. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711 (c) (1)(iv). Finding
no mitigating circumstances, the jury sentenced Blystone to death. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence.
The United States Supreme Courtgranted certiorari to determine whether
the mandatory aspects of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute un-
constitutionally limited the jury's discretion.
